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It is the obligation and burden of the employee to supply 
proof for both the legal and medical causation tests. The 
employee has not satisfied either test. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court has previously held that in workers1 compensation 
proceedings commencing after January 1, 1988 that the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act applies.2 Accordingly, if the 
confusing order on review of the Industrial Commission held that 
the Allen test did not need to be met by the employee, the 
employer urges that this Court apply the rationale set forth in 
Points I and II of the employer's original brief and hold that 
the applicant had to meet its burden under both the legal 
causation and the medical causation tests of Allen. 
Because there is only medical causation testimony as to a 
one-time lift of 28 pounds, the Court should look no further than 
this one incident for legal causation and should find that 
neither the medical or the legal causation test of Allen was met. 
Finally, the record is absolutely clear that any waiver by 
the employer as to the medical causation issue pertained only to 
the one-time lift of luggage and nothing else. Once the 
employee's theory of the case became clear, the employer, by its 
conduct at the time of the hearing withdrew any stipulation 
regarding medical causation. 
Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, lie P.2d 63 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
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ARGUMENT, 
IP THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER ON MOTION FOR REVIEW 
REVERSES THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, THEN THIS COURT 
SHOULD REVERSE THE COMMISSION AND HOLD THAT THE EMPLOYEE HAD 
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Because the proceedings in the instant case were commenced 
long after January 1, 1988#6 the UAPA applies in construing the 
Industrial Commission's Order on Motion for Review. 
The employer urges the Court to hold, as does the employee, 
that the effect and meaning of the Order of the Industrial 
Commission was merely to affirm the A.L.J, that the employee's 
back problems were due, in part, to his pre-existing back 
condition. If the Court determines this is the effect of the 
Order of the Commission, then only the issues raised in Points 
III through VI of the employer's original brief need be 
considered. 
II. THE EMPLOYEE FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF IN 
SHOWING EITHER LEGAL CAUSATION OR MEDICAL CAUSATION. 
The claimant has the burden to prove that his injury is 
compensable.7 Although the employee in his fact statement goes 
into great detail about the strenuous nature of his travel 
activities and how this aspect of his employment added 
significantly to the risk he faced for back injury, there is no 
medical testimony stating that in fact these activities caused or 
contributed to the employee's herniated discs. And if the travel 
6
 The employee's Application for Hearing was filed March 
6, 1989. See Record (R.) 8. 
7
 Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 
1986), Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 
1982); Redmond Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 454 
P.2d 283 (Utah 1969); Jensen v. U.S. Fuel Co., 424 P.2d 440 (Utah 
1967); Wherritt v. Industrial Commission, 110 P.2d 374 (Utah 
1941). 
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Under the medical cause test, the claimant must sho^ 1: y 
evidence, opinion or otherwise that the stress, strain 
or exertion required by his or her occupation led to 
the resulting injury or disability. In the event the 
claimant cannot show a medical causation connection, 
compensation should be denied. (Emphasis added,) 
Stated somewhat differently i i i this court's recent decision 
in Nyrehn i 1 ndustrial Commission:9 
The Ut ah Supreme Court held in .Allen that a cl aimant 
must supply proof of both "legal" and "medical" 
causation. "Under the legal test, the law must defs-ie 
what kind of exertion satisfies the test of '^risin:. 
out of the employment1. . . [the] doctors must say 
whether the exertion (having been held legally 
sufficient to support compensation) in fact caused this 
finjury] 1U {Emphasis added.) 
t •ancaster i * G I Z be r t Dei 're lopment 736 P 2d 23 7 (I Jtah 
il i in in i l l mi ii I mi mi i l l 1 2 5 , ::i s ' S :: ) . 
Ill a t i<j. 
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1987) 
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Therefore, although apparently the legal causation standard 
may be determined by the finder of fact, only "doctors must say 
whether the exertion in fact caused this [injury].11 The doctor 
in this case refused to link the injury to employee's travel 
activities in two responses11 and linked it only to the one-time 
lift of 28 pounds. This surely cannot be unusual exertion since 
Allen specifically states that the lifting of luggage is part of 
the "typical activities and exertions expected of men and women 
in the latter part of the twentieth century." 
A case very similar to the one at bar is Chadwick v. 
Industrial Commission.™ There, the hospital employee claimed 
that he had contracted an eye infection related to his 
employment. In language virtually identical to the language used 
by the treating physician in the instant case who provided the 
only medical evidence on causation, the medical panel in Chadwick 
stated: 
The fact that the hospital environment provides a much 
greater exposure to all types of infections would 
suggest that the applicant's eye problems could be 
traced to his employment.13 (Emphasis added.) 
The A.L.J, in that case, as he should have done in this 
case, declined to award benefits because he could not determine 
with reasonable certainty that the employee's eye condition was 
caused as a result of his employment. The Court went on to note 
R. 156-157, R. 356. 
572 P.2d 400 (Utah 1977) (Chadwick). 
Id. at 401. 
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that the burden of proof is upon the employee to establish his 
entitlement to benefits and show medical causation. In upholding 
the denial of benefits the Utah Supreme Court concluded: 
Plaintiff's argument that the medical panel report to 
the effect that there was a comparatively high risk of 
infection in his employment and that there therefore 
existed the possibility that his eye infection could 
have come from that source is not entirely without 
plausibility. However, the mere fact that it could 
have come from that source or even that there is some 
likelihood that it did so, does not compel a finding 
that that was the fact. . . In order for this court to 
overturn the commission's refusal to grant plaintiff an 
award on the evidence herein, we would have to depart 
from the field of proper review and enter that of 
probability or conjecture, . . . . u (Emphasis added.) 
This is exactly what has happened in the instant case. The 
Industrial Commission departed from the proper standard of proof 
as to medical causation and awarded benefits based on conjecture. 
On two separate occasions the specific question was put to Dr. 
Rich as to whether the traveling of the employee caused the 
injury. In both instances, Dr. Rich declined to state that it 
did and merely said that it "can" or "could."15 This is 
insufficient to support a finding of medical causation as to the 
employee's travel schedule. Therefore, given the total and utter 
lack of evidence regarding medical causation to a degree of 
reasonable certainty, the A.L.J, as well as the Commission erred 
in finding medical causation for anything other than the one-
time lift of 28 pounds, which one-time lift did not meet Allen's 
Id. at 402. 
R. 156-157, R. 356. 
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legal causation standard requiring unusual exertion or increased 
risk of injury above what a worker normally faces in everyday 
life. 
III. THE EMPLOYER'S ATTORNEY OBJECTED TO AND NEVER STIPULATED TO 
TRAVEL OR TRAVEL FATIGUE AS A FACTOR IN MEDICAL CAUSATION. 
HIS STIPULATION EXTENDED ONLY TO THE 28 POUND LIFT OF 
LUGGAGE. 
The employer's attorney initially stipulated that there was 
no medical causation issue, but this stipulation pertained only 
to the lifting episode on May 6, 1988, when the employee lifted 
28 pounds. This stipulation did not include travel fatigue or 
any other activity. The allegation of how the accident occurred 
according to the employee's Application for Hearing is as 
follows: 
While involved in business travel for my employer, was 
waiting in airport. Was attempting to move to escape 
heavy tobacco smoke from people around me. As jerked 
baggage computer equipment to change seats, felt sudden 
pull and strain in lower back area. It became 
progressively more painful causing me to seek medical 
help a few days later.16 
The record is replete with counsel's withdrawal of any 
stipulation to medical causation beyond the one-time baggage 
lifting incident. Counsel objected to testimony beyond the 
employee's initial allegations of the scope of this accident and 
thereby withdrew any stipulation based on other facts presented 
at the time of hearing before the A.L.J. 
R. 8-9. 
- 8 -
It is true that the employer took the deposition of the 
employee prior to the date of the hearing, but contrary to the 
A.L.J.'s instructions17 it was never filed with the Industrial 
Commission and is not available as part of the record. 
At the time of the hearing when claimant testified regarding 
his travel schedule, defense counsel immediately objected as 
follows: 
MR. WHITE: Your Honor, I would object to this line of 
questioning, and the reason is, the Application for 
Hearing says that we had an accident on the 6th day of 
May, that there was one incident and it goes on to two 
pages. And here we have all this extraneous 
information about all the other activities. I have 
never previously seen a claim that this contributed to 
the problem and I think we have a notice problem here 
if we are going to claim that this caused it here for 
the first time in this hearing.18 (Emphasis added.) 
When claimant's counsel attempted to introduce exhibits 
regarding travel, defendant's counsel objected as follows: 
THE COURT: These have been marked as Exhibit A-2. Mr. 
White, do you have any objections? 
MR. WHITE: Well, yes. I will object again because I 
think it's not relevant. We are talking about a May 
6th accident and here we are introducing all this stuff 
which is really not material — not relevant.19 
(Emphasis added.) 
This was a continuation to the objection previously noted 
regarding notice and the new theory that travel medically caused 
or contributed to the employee's injury. The A.L.J, overruled 
R. 27-29. 
R. 42, lines 12-21. 
R. 45, lines 2-8. 
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the objection of the employer and his ruling was sustained by the 
Industrial Commission when the issue was raised on review. 
In closing argument, defense counsel once again raised the 
medical causation and notice issues by arguing as follows: 
MR. WHITE: How may I please the Court? [sic] 
[Incorrect transcription, this should be: Now, may it 
please the Court] Your Honor, now only after hearing 
the evidence, I have determined not only is there a 
legal causation problem here, there is also a medical 
causation problem. We know from Allen and its 
following cases, that both prongs of the test must be 
met, and I want to speak to both of them. 
MR. DEWSNUP: Your Honor, I would object to that. He 
has already conceded there wasn't a medical causation 
question, so I didn't emphasize it in the evidence. 
THE COURT: At the beginning of the hearing, I asked 
you if there was a medical causation problem and you 
indicated — 
MR. WHITE: Well, that's before I heard the evidence, 
Your Honor. I got this report just today [referring to 
the report of J. Charles Rich] and I would like to 
speak to that and — 
THE COURT: Well, let me — well, let me finish, Mr. 
White. At the beginning, I asked, under the Allen 
case, if we had any issue on legal causation and you 
said, no, the only issue is legal. Strike that. If we 
had any problems with medical causation and you said, 
no. 
MR. WHITE: Well, if I may also point out, I objected 
to the testimony on this other information because the 
only evidence I had when I got here this morning was 
that there was an allegation that this pertained to the 
May 6th incident. I get in here and now — and that's 
in the claim, that's in the Application for Hearing, 
that was at the time of the deposition and now I get in 
here, after I made that representation, and hear new 
evidence, which I objected to and so I think, since 
evidence as to another causation other than what was 
alleged, other than which I had notice of at the outset 
of this hearing, I should — 
THE COURT: Which — 
- 10 -
MR. WHITE: Well, particularly this travel. I had 
never heard — that the sole allegation, as I pointed 
out in the Application for Hearing, is that the May 6th 
incident caused this problem and now Mr. Dewsnup comes 
in here and opens up a new theory and says that all 
this travel caused this. That these long trips — Now, 
that's the first I have heard about this. And so I 
think I should certainly be able to respond to that and 
I think there is definitely a medical causation 
question when it comes to those allegations that the 
trip and the travel and the moving here and in and out 
of the hotel and all this business, caused the problem 
which he is complaining of.20 (Emphasis added.) 
The stipulation as to medical causation pertained only to 
the 28 pound lift on May 6, 1988. There was no stipulation as to 
employee's travel schedule satisfying the medical causation 
standard and any stipulation regarding medical causation was 
withdrawn. 
Furthermore, the failure to allow the employer to dispute 
medical causation when the theory of accident as contained in the 
Application for Hearing changed to a broader theory of accident 
would result in surprise and a denial of due process denying the 
employer the right to respond. This right is guaranteed under 
the 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution and 
the Utah State Constitution, Article 1, Section 7. In light of 
the conduct of employer's counsel subsequent to the applicant's 
theory of accident and legal and medical causation coming fully 
to light, and the fact that Dr. Rich's first letter was first 
R. 87-89. 
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produced on the date of the hearing before the A.L.J., the 
employer should be permitted to dispute both legal and medical 
causation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the purposes of construing the meaning of the order of 
the Industrial Commission, the employer urges that the employee's 
interpretation of the meaning of that order he adopted and that 
the order of the Commission on Review he interpreted to affirm 
the findings and conclusions of the A.L.J., notwithstanding 
inconsistent language within the order. If this is the case, it 
is only necessary to look to Points III through VI of the 
employer's original brief on appeal. However, there can be no 
doubt that the Utah Rules of Administrative Procedure apply to 
the order of the Industrial Commission. If the order does not 
simply affirm the A.L.J., whose findings and conclusions were 
based on a construction of the Allen test, then it should be 
overturned and construed to be consistent with the A.L.J.'s order 
for purposes of appeal. 
As far as the legal and medical causation issues are 
concerned, there is no medical evidence to support the conclusion 
that any work activity other than the one-time 28 pound lift on 
May 6, 1988 caused claimant's disc herniations. Moreover, this 
lift does not satisfy the Allen test requiring unusual exertion 
or additional risk in the workplace. 
21
 R. 87, lines 17-29. 
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Finally, employer's counsel did not stipulate regarding 
medical causation except as to the one-time, 28 pound lift since 
this is the only work activity that the employee's Application 
for Hearing referred to. Any stipulation regarding causation and 
the employee's travel was withdrawn as evidenced by the repeated 
objections and statements of counsel at the time of the hearing. 
Even if it weren't withdrawn, it would be error to uphold 
benefits in the face of insufficient medical proof. Fundamental 
fairness and due process require that counsel not be prevented 
from arguing a defense when plaintiff's theory finally becomes 
clear. 
Based on the foregoing, the employer urges this Court to 
reverse the Industrial Commission's order and deny benefits on 
the grounds that (1) the employee did not satisfy the burden of 
proof as to medical causation to a degree of reasonable medical 
certainty, and (2) that employee's single lift of luggage which 
was followed by a sudden onset of back pain requiring surgery was 
not unusual exertion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Larry R.l White 
Attorney! for Plaintiff-
Appellant (Employer) 
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